Evidence—Novel Scientific Evidence—DNA Profiling Held Admissible Under the Relevancy Standard. Prater v. State. by Spory, Ralph
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 1 Article 3 
1992 
Evidence—Novel Scientific Evidence—DNA Profiling Held 
Admissible Under the Relevancy Standard. Prater v. State. 
Ralph Spory 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ralph Spory, Evidence—Novel Scientific Evidence—DNA Profiling Held Admissible Under the Relevancy 
Standard. Prater v. State., 15 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 71 (1992). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss1/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
NOTES
EVIDENCE-NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE-DNA PROFILING HELD
ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE RELEVANCY STANDARD. Prater v. State, 307
Ark. 180, 820 S.W.2d 429 (1991).
I. FACTS
The defendant, Louis Prater, was arrested shortly after the police
responded to a call from a rape victim in southwest Little Rock.' Secre-
tion samples were collected from the victim's vagina, and blood was
taken from the defendant.' The vaginal fluid and blood samples were
sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) laboratory in Wash-
ington, D.C. for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) print identification
tests.3 The defendant was informed that DNA evidence would be of-
fered at his trial."
At the defendant's rape trial on October 26 and 27, 1989, Dr.
Harold Deadman, an expert witness, testified for the State concerning
DNA testing. 5 The DNA data was ruled inadmissible by the presiding
special judge and a mistrial resulted. After the State announced that it
would retry the defendant, it asked for a hearing to determine the ad-
missibility of DNA testing data.7 A few weeks later, the defendant re-
quested funds to have a DNA expert examine the DNA test data.8
At an evidentiary hearing on November 30, the regularly elected
I. Prater v. State, 307 Ark. 180, 184, 820 S.W.2d 429, 430 (1991). The victim, a seven-
teen-year old girl, had been raped in a laundromat. As police searched the area, the victim spotted
and identified the defendant. Id.
2. Id. The victim was taken to University Hospital where the samples were collected. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The evidence would show that the probability of obtaining a random match on a
member of an unrelated black population was only I in 3,700. Id.
5. Id. at 200, 820 S.W.2d at 439. Dr. Deadman had a Ph.D. in organic chemistry and was a
supervising special agent and member of the DNA analysis unit at the FBI laboratory. Id. at 194,
820 S.W.2d at 436.
6. Id. at 200, 820 S.W.2d at 439. Ruling that the DNA results were inadmissible, the spe-
cial judge declared a mistrial because the jury had heard Dr. Deadman's DNA testimony. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. The court had found the defendant to be an indigent. Id.
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judge ruled that the DNA testing data was admissible, but due to a
shortage of county funds, he refused to provide funds or appoint DNA
experts to perform an analysis for the defendant.9 However, the trial
judge later ordered that funds be provided for the defendant to have his
own expert. 10 The defendant's expert had the opportunity to examine
all of the DNA testing data before trial."
At the trial, Dr. Deadman testified to the quality control standards
and the in-house proficiency testing used by the FBI in its testing labo-
ratory." Two doctors from the University of Arkansas for Medical Sci-
ences, Dr. James Hardin and Dr. Gary Bannon, testified that the FBI
procedures and methodology for conducting the DNA testing were
"very reliable."' 3 The defendant's expert, Dr. Benes, testified that from
the data she could detect no human error in the FBI testing process."
However, the experts disagreed as to the reliability of the interpre-
tation of the autoradiographic patterns. 5 Dr. Benes, the defendant's
expert, disagreed with the conclusion of Dr. Deadman concerning the
matching of samples taken from the victim's vagina and samples from
9. Id. This ruling was erroneous because the defendant had not been provided with an
expert nor had the defendant's expert been given the opportunity to examine the evidence, the
testing procedures, or the protocol of the testing laboratory prior to the evidentiary hearing. Id.
The court stated, "Ideally, an accused shall even be provided with the actual DNA samples in
order to reproduce the tests." Id.
10. Id. After the trial judge ordered that funds be provided, the defendant obtained the
services of Dr. Helen Benes, an assistant professor in the Department of Biochemistry and Molec-
ular Biology at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS). Id. at 195, 820 S.W.2d
at 436.
11. Id. at 200, 820 S.W.2d at 439. The State provided Dr. Benes with the autoradi-
ographics, methodology, and results, which she had time to review. Id. An autoradiographic is film
which is exposed by placing it next to a radioactive probe of DNA fragments as part of the DNA
identification matching process. Id. at 193, 820 S.W.2d at 435.
12. Id. at 194-95, 820 S.W.2d at 436.
13. Id. at 195, 820 S.W.2d at 436. Dr. James Hardin was an associate professor of
medicine, biochemistry, and molecular biology at UAMS and associate director of research at the
Arkansas Cancer Research Center. Id. Dr. Gary Bannon was an assistant professor in the Depart-
ment of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology at the UAMS. Id.
14. Id. Dr. Benes arrived at her conclusion by examining the laboratory notes provided by
Dr. Deadman. Id.
15. Id. at 196, 820 S.W.2d at 437. Dr. Deadman testified that he had performed four
probes of the samples taken from the defendant and victim, and there were two matches of the
upper bands. Id. See infra notes 54, 105 and accompanying text. He also stated that he was able
to get a match of both the upper and lower bands on the fourth probe by using a longer radiation
exposure. 307 Ark. at 196, 820 S.W.2d at 437. The defendant's expert, Dr. Benes, disagreed with
Dr. Deadman, and testified that she saw only one clear match of the upper bands. Id. However,
since two of the matches were unclear, she did understand how others could find matches. Id.
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the defendant.16 In rebuttal, however, the State's experts, Dr. Bannon
and Dr. Hardin, disagreed with Dr. Benes and fully agreed with Dr.
Deadman's interpretation. 17 The trial court heard the testimony of all
four experts,1 8 and considered the possibility of a mistake on the part of
the scientists in deciding whether the DNA matching technique was
reliable. 9
The State also presented testimony to show the probability of ran-
dom matches during DNA identification testing. Dr. Benes, while tes-
tifying for the defendant, expressed concern in two areas. 21 First, she
questioned whether the DNA sample data base for black people was
representative of the general population, and secondly, she questioned
whether the DNA data bases were in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. 2
The rebuttal testimony by Dr. Deadman and Dr. Hardin established
that the probabilities in this case were conservative.23 The court agreed
that conservative probability estimates may correct population genetic
calculations for populations not in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium .2
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling on
the admissibility of the DNA evidence 28 and adopted the relevancy
26
approach of the Uniform Rules of Evidence 7 as to the admissibility of
DNA testing and profiling evidence, as well as other forms of scientific
evidence. 28 The Arkansas Supreme Court determined that the DNA




20. Id. at 197, 820 S.W.2d at 437.
21. Id. at 199, 820 S.W.2d at 438.
22. Id. This principle is named for "G.H. Hardy and W. Weinberg, who in 1908 indepen-
dently formulated a theorem that became the foundation of population genetics. According to the
Hardy-Weinberg principle, gene frequencies will remain constant from generation to generation
within a population unless outside forces act to change it, so long as mating remains random."
People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 657 (App. Div. 1988). If there is deviation from Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium, it can be statistically recognized by adjusting gene frequency observations.
Id.
23. 307 Ark. at 199, 820 S.W.2d at 438.
24. Id. at 199, 820 S.W.2d at 439. The trial court relied on expert testimony given in the
1989 New York DNA case, People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 993 (Sup. Ct. 1989) ("Con-
servative or reduced calculations may also correct the Hardy-Weinberg deviation problems.").
25. 307 Ark. at 201, 820 S.W.2d at 439.
26. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
27. ARK. R. EvID. 401, 402, and 702.
28. Prater, 307 Ark. at 185, 820 S.W.2d at 431. The relevancy approach to admissibility of
scientific evidence is based on FED. R. EvID. 401, 402, and 702. PAUL C. GIANNELLI AND EDWARD
J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5 (F), at 29 (1986) [hereinafter GIANNELLI].
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autoradiographic evidence may be ambiguous and difficult to interpret,
but the trial court had broad discretion over the admissibility of expert
testimony. 9 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it allowed the probability calculation
data, but it did not rule out a successful attack in future cases.3 0 Prater
v. State, 307 Ark. 180, 820 S.W.2d 429 (1991).
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Although scientists began to look into the nucleus of cells in the
early 1800's, and the exact nature of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) was
known in 1953,31 it was not until a 1985 rape case in England that
DNA matching was first used to track down the guilty individual.3 2 In
1989 the Virginia Supreme Court became the highest court in any
state to uphold a criminal conviction based on DNA scientific evi-
dence.33 In October of 1990 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was
the first federal appellate court to consider the admissibility of DNA
evidence in a rape case.34 More recently, in January 1992 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that DNA evidence, such as the theo-
ries and techniques of restriction fragment length polymorphism
(RFLP)3 5 analysis, may be routinely admitted in criminal trials if its
probative value, materiality, and reliability outweigh its tendency to
mislead, prejudice, and confuse the jury."
29. 307 Ark. at 196, 820 S.W.2d at 437 (citing Sims v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 297 Ark. 588,
764 S.W.2d 427 (1989)).
30. 307 Ark, at 199, 820 S.W.2d at 439.
31. 307 Ark. at 191, 820 S.W.2d at 434.
32. Mark Thompson, DNA's Troubled Debut, 8 CAL. LAW, June 1988, at 36, 40. DNA
fingerprinting was used prior to this for paternity testing under laboratory conditions. Kennedy v.
State, 545 So.2d 214, 218 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
33. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775 (Va. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 759
(1990). See C. Thomas Blair, Comment, Spencer v. Commonwealth and Recent Developments in
the Admissibility of DNA Fingerprint Evidence, 76 VA. L. REV. 853, 854 (1990).
34. United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990). See Lorie A. Robinson, Note,
United States v. Two Bulls: Eighth Circuit Addresses Admissibility of Forensic DNA Evidence,
37 LoY. L. REV. 173, 174-75 (1991). The court vacated the rape conviction of Matthew Sylvester
Two Bulls and held that the district court had incorrectly allowed the admission of DNA evidence
without testimony on the scientific acceptability and reliability of the evidence and testing proce-
dures. Id. at 174.
35. Restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis and polymerase chain reac-
tion (PCR) are the two technologies used today for DNA analysis. Ricardo G. Federico, "The
Genetic Witness' - DNA Evidence and Canada's Criminal Law, 33 CRIM. L. Q. 204, 205 (1990-
91). The majority of forensic case work uses the RFLP technology. Id.
36. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992).
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In Prater, the court included a lengthy discussion of the DNA
molecule and the laboratory procedures which are used in its analysis.37
Two scientists, an American, James Watson, and an Englishman, Fran-
cis Crick, discovered the structure of the DNA molecule while working
jointly at Cambridge University in 1953.38 The DNA structure is de-
scribed as a double helix which resembles a twisted ladder or spiral
staircase." The sides of the ladder consist of alternating segments
made up of phosphate and sugar.40 The rungs of the ladder, or steps in
the staircase, are made up of base pairs from four possible base sub-
stances: adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine.' 1 Each rung or step
consists of a combination of only two of the bases; however, adenine
can only combine with thymine and cytosine can only combine with
guanine.' The order of the bases or rungs on one strand of the DNA
helix (one side of the ladder) determines the order of the bases on the
other strand of the double helix.4 3 Several base pairs or rungs of the
ladder together in an ordered sequence form a gene." A segment of the
DNA ladder, which contains several genes, provides the genetic code
which is passed from one generation of cells to the next.' 5
Although long segments of DNA are the same among different
people, certain segments are highly variable."6 The areas or segments
which are different are called polymorphisms. 47  Due to these
polymorphic regions or areas, the DNA pattern of all individuals, with
the exception of identical twins, is different.' 8
37. 307 Ark. at 191-94, 820 S.W.2d at 434-36. See Frederick A. Bechtold, Note, The Ad-
missibility of Scientific Evidence: DNA Print Identifications, 19 STETSON L. REV. 245, 248
(1989). The DNA molecule is a significant forensic tool because there is a complete and identical
copy of the molecule in the nucleus of every cell in the body with the exception of the red blood
cells. Id. Forensic medicine is "a science that deals with the relation and application of medical
facts to legal problems." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 889 (3d ed. 1966).
38. See People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645 (App. Div. 1988).
39. Id. at 645-46.




44. Id. at 648.
45. Id. Each gene in the string is different from the others in the string because the order of
the bases and base pairs is not restricted. Id. The only restriction is that adenine combines with
thymine and cytosine combines with guanine. Id.





The DNA matching technique is possible because restriction en-
donuclease, "9 an enzyme, cuts the DNA helix (ladder) at specific loca-
tions when it is applied to the molecule. 50 By applying these restriction
enzymes to DNA molecules, the polymorphic regions are cut into frag-
ments of varying lengths. 51 DNA matching techniques can then be ap-
plied to the polymorphic regions.52
The RFLP DNA matching technique requires six major proce-
dures:53 extraction of the DNA; cutting the DNA molecule with re-
striction enzymes; lining up the fragments according to length by gel
electrophoresis; 54 separating the double DNA strands and transferring
them from a gel to a nylon membrane;55 lighting up the fragments by
recombining the separated polymorphic fragments with probes of radio-
active marker substances; 56 and production of an autoradiograph which
consists of dark bands which resemble bar codes.51 Scientists then com-
pare the autoradiographs, or autorads, of the unknown sample with
those of the known sample to determine if there is a match. 5' The com-
parison is done either manually or by machine.
59
An alternative method of DNA testing is the polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) method.60 The PCR method can be used on samples
that are too degraded for RFLP testing, but, to date, all reviewing
49. Id. Scientists isolated the first restriction endonuclease, or restriction enzyme in 1970.
Id. Restriction enzymes cut the DNA helix where the helix contains a certain genetic code or
specific sequence of base pairs. EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 205 (B), at
622 (3d ed. Supp. 1987).
50. Caldwell, 393 S.E.2d at 439.
51. id.
52. Id. at 440.
53. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 649-50. See Federico, supra note 35, at 209-10.
54. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 649. In the gel electrophoresis process the DNA fragments are
placed in a thin layer of jello-like substance which is electrically charged. Id. Since the DNA
fragments are negatively charged, they migrate from the negative pole of the gel toward the posi-
tive pole. Id. Because the smaller fragments can migrate more easily, the fragments form in bands
or parallel lines according to their length with the smaller fragments nearer the positive pole and
larger fragments nearer the negative pole. Id.
55. Id. The technique is called Southern Blotting. Id. at 650. The fragments are split chemi-
cally to separate the rungs of the ladder. Id. at 649. After splitting, the pattern is moved to a
nylon membrane which is more stable than the gel substance. Id. at 649-50.
56. Id. at 650.
57. Id. An x-ray film is exposed to the radioactive fragments on the membrane for several
days. Id. See Cobey v. State, 559 A.2d 391, 397 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (diagramming "The
DNA Fingerprinting Process").
58. Gayle Shines, Forensic DNA Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Judicial Reviews are
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courts have considered only the RFLP technique. 61
A major concern with the DNA matching technique is the possi-
bility of a random match."' To calculate the potential of random
matches, data bases are maintained for Caucasian, Black, and His-
panic ethnic groups.63 The use of these data bases and population ge-
netic equations have calculated the likelihood of random matching."
DNA profiling, also called testing, matching, or fingerprinting,6 5
has been the subject of controversy in several state courts.66 The offer
of DNA evidence has caused some courts to reconsider the standards
for the introduction of evidence based on new or novel scientific tech-
niques.6 7 Courts use two approaches to rule on the admissibility of such
evidence; they often are referred to as the "Frye standard" 8 and the
"relevancy standard." 69
The Frye standard was enunciated in 1923 when the Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia stated that evidence developed from a
scientific principle or discovery will be admissible only if the principle
or discovery has gained general acceptance in its particular field.10 Ap-
plication of the test requires identification of the field in which the
principle or discovery lies and a determination of whether experts in
that field accept the principle. 7' The traditional standard for the intro-
duction of scientific evidence has been the Frye test.7
Those who argue against application of the Frye test focus on
61. Id.
62. Id. at 21.
63. Blair, supra note 33, at 858.
64. Blair, supra note 33, at 858.
65. Juan M. Gonzales, Attacking Forensic DNA Profiling Evidence for Lack of Validation,
46 GUILD PRAC. 51, 51 (1989). Forensic DNA profiling is the terminology used to indicate any
DNA identification test which is performed on forensic specimens. Id.
66. See United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir. 1990).
67. Blair, supra note 33, at 858.
68. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
69. Blair, supra note 33, at 858.
70. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. The Frye standard refers to the often quoted passage:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evi-
dential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or dis-
covery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id.
71. GIANNELLI, supra note 28, § 1-5 (B), at 16.
72. GIANNELLI, supra note 28, § 1-5, at 10-11.
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Rules 401, 402, and 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.73 This so
called "relevancy test" is not consistent with the Frye test.74 Under the
relevancy test, scientific evidence may be admitted if it is shown to be
helpful to the jury under Rule 702. 7' Helpfulness is demonstrated by
showing that it is based upon data reasonably relied upon by experts in
the field under Rule 703.78 The court must also find that the evidence is
relevant under Rule 401. 77 If relevant, it should be admitted under
Rule 40278 unless its probative value is outweighed by some negative
effect under Rule 403.79 Under the relevancy analysis, general accept-
ance in the scientific field or scientific community is not an indispensa-
ble prerequisite to admissibility, though it remains a factor to con-
sider.8 0 If scientific evidence is treated the same as other evidence,
admissibility is determined by weighing its probative value against the
danger that it might prejudice or mislead the jury, not by its accept-
ance in the relevant scientific community. 1
73. GIANNELLI, supra note 28, § 1-5 (F), at 29.
74. GIANNELLI, supra note 28, § 1-5 (F), at 30.
75. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702.
76. FED. R. EvID. 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
77. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
78. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R.
EvID. 402.
79. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
FED. R. EVID. 403.
80. GIANNELLI, supra note 28, § 1-5 (F), at 30.
81. GIANNELLI, supra note 28, § 1-6, at 31.
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition upon the court's taking judicial
notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be
received unless there are other reasons for exclusion. Particularly, its probative value
may be overborne by the familiar dangers of prejudicing or misleading the jury, unfair
surprise and undue consumption of time.
GIANNELLI, supra note 28, § 1-6, at 31 (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK. EVIDENCE, 363-64
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Three primary arguments for retaining the Frye test have been
advanced: it is more efficient because it avoids time consuming litiga-
tion over the acceptability of scientific techniques; it ensures conformity
of rulings; and it provides for a sufficient number of experts in the field
to review the novel technique. 2
New York scrutinizes scientific evidence under the Frye standard.
In People v. Castro83 the court concluded that credible DNA forensic
identification evidence was admissible scientific evidence under the
Frye standard."" In Castro the DNA analysis was conducted by
Lifecodes Corporation (Lifecodes) using RFLP techniques.8 5 The court
ordered a pre trial hearing to determine the admissibility of DNA sci-
entific evidence.8" The prosecution called five prominent experts in the
areas of molecular biology, population genetics, and DNA testing pro-
cedures.8 7 The defendant also called five experts from similar scientific
fields.88 The Supreme Court of New York stated that it was unaware
of any case in which the Frye standard had barred the admission of the
DNA identification evidence.8"
The court in Castro pursued a three-pronged analysis to evaluate
the DNA scientific evidence. 90 First, it inquired whether the scientific
community accepted the theory of DNA testing. 91 Next, it evaluated
whether techniques and experiments were available to produce reliable
DNA testing results.92 And finally, it considered whether the testing
laboratory followed the accepted scientific techniques. 93 The court fo-
cused its attention on the third prong of the analysis. 91 The court con-
cluded that, although there was general acceptance of the theory un-
(1954)).
82. Bechtold, supra note 37, at 252.
83. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
84. Id. at 995. In Castro the defendant was accused of murdering a twenty-year old preg-
nant woman and her two-year old daughter. Id. at 985. The defendant had blood stains on his
wristwatch when he was arrested, and the prosecution attempted to prove the blood on the wrist-
watch was that of the victim. Id.
85. Id. at 986.
86. Id. The hearing was an exhaustive review of DNA forensic techniques which produced
over 5000 pages of testimony. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.








derlying DNA identification and there was acceptance of the scientific
community of the ability for the technique and experiments to produce
reliable results, it was necessary to conduct a pretrial hearing to deter-
mine if the laboratory substantially performed the accepted tests and
techniques . 5 After the pretrial hearing, the court decided as a matter
of law that the laboratory had not used the generally accepted tech-
nique and procedures under the third prong of its analysis. 96
Castro was not the first New York Court decision to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. A New York County Court ruled ear-
lier in People v. Wesley 97 that DNA fingerprinting evidence is admissi-
ble under the Frye standard. 8 In Wesley both prosecution and defense
called several expert witnesses, but not one witness attacked the scien-
tific principles and technology behind DNA matching and their accept-
ance in the fields of molecular biology, biochemistry, or human
genetics. 99
The defendants attacked Lifecodes' laboratory procedures, meth-
odology, and quality control, and Lifecodes' population studies estab-
lishing the level of identification in the relevant population.100 The
State's experts testified that the procedures used by Lifecodes in its
DNA Print Identification, many of which were developed at other insti-
tutions, were accepted as reliable by the scientific community.101 The
defendant's expert, Dr. Richard Borowsky, stated concern that the evi-
dence presented by the State did not include the raw data from which
95. Id. at 987, 999.
96. Id. at 999.
97. 533 N.Y.S. 2d 643 (App. Div. 1988).
98. Id. at 659. The hearing concerned the State's motions to extract blood from two de-
fendants to conduct DNA comparison testing. Id. at 643. One defendant, Bailey, was charged
with rape in the first degree and the other defendant, Wesley, was charged with burglary and
suspected of murder. Id. The DNA from the defendant charged with rape would be tested against
the DNA of an aborted fetus. Id. DNA from the blood stained clothing of the second defendant
was to be tested against the DNA from the victim, but the DNA from the defendant, Wesley, was
to be used for control purposes during the testing. Id.
99. Id. at 650.
100. Id. Lifecodes' laboratory was the commercial laboratory performing the analysis. Id. at
643. Lifecodes claimed the level of identity for their DNA Print Identification was one in 1.4
billion for American Blacks and one in 840 million for American Whites. Id. at 659.
101. Id. at 655-56. Dr. Baird, one of the original scientific employees at Lifecodes, testified
to the standards and quality control and that Lifecodes had introduced programs for proficiency
testing of blind DNA matching. Id. at 654-55. All of the trial DNA matches were correct. Id. at
655. Dr. Kenneth K. Kidd, a Professor of Human Genetics, Psychology, and Biology at Yale
University and an expert witness for the State, testified that the principles, procedures, and tech-
niques involved were reliable and accepted by the scientific community. Id. at 653.
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one could determine the validity of the claimed identity probabilities. 10 2
He was also concerned that the population sample size considered was
too small.' 03
The accuracy of identity claimed by Lifecodes was one in 1.4 bil-
lion for American Blacks and one in 840 million for American
Whites.' 0" However, these probabilities are predicted on the condition
that the four probes of the DNA segments are independent and ran-
dom.105 The State's expert, Dr. Kidd, testified that the population sam-
ple size was moderately large and that the probability estimates were
"perfectly valid."'0 6 Dr. Kidd further testified that in order to account
for some unexpected observations of gene types the mean power of
identity should be reduced at most by a factor of ten.107 Since "DNA
fingerprinting" was a scientific test generally accepted by the scientific
community in the applicable fields, the technique was admissible under
the Frye standard, and the motion to take samples from the defendants
for DNA identification was granted.1
0 8
In a subsequent Maryland sexual assault case, Cobey v. State,'0 9
the defendant challenged the acceptance in the scientific community of
a single locus probe technique for identification of specific DNA
polymorphic fragments." 0 At the evidentiary hearing, five experts testi-
fied for the State that DNA fingerprinting was reliable and accepted in
102. Id. at 657.
103. Id. at 658. Dr. Richard Borowsky, Associate Professor of Biology at New York Uni-
versity and an expert in population genetics, did not disagree that Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium
was obtained, but he was concerned that the People's exhibits did not contain the raw data which
was used to make that finding. Id. at 657. Although Dr. Borowsky withdrew his request for the
raw data, he was concerned that the sample size considered by Lifecodes was too small. Id. at
658. The Hardy-Weinberg principle states that within a given population the frequency of a par-
ticular gene remains constant among generations if mating is random and external influences are
not introduced. Id. at 657.
104. Id. at 656.
105. Id. "A probe is a segment of recombinant DNA that is engineered to go to a particu-
lar, pre-determined locus on a particular chromosome (the location of the particular gene, allele,
or polymorphic DNA segment being used)." Id. at 653.
106. Id. at 658.
107. Id. Dr. Kidd, in fact, thought that an adjustment much less than a factor of ten would
be sufficient. Id. The appeals court concluded that from the evidence presented at trial and be-
cause of due process concerns the mean power of identity (the accuracy of the DNA print identifi-
cation test) should be limited by a factor of ten. Id. at 659.
108. Id. The specimens were to be taken in a medically approved and safe manner. Id.
109. 559 A.2d 391 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
110. Id. at 397. Cellmark Diagnostics of Germantown, Maryland performed the DNA
matching test in Cobey. Id. at 392. Although Cellmark used RFLP procedures similar to
Lifecodes, Cellmark used a single locus probe technique. Id. at 397-98.
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the scientific community. 1" No experts testified to the contrary for the
defendant.
1 12
As in Wesley,'" the defendant, Cobey, challenged the size of the
data base used by the laboratory to arrive at an estimate of the
probability of a DNA mismatch." Experts testifying for the State
claimed that the number of individuals in the Cellmark data base was
within generally acceptable scientific criteria, and the court of special
appeals held that the trial court did not err in finding that DNA finger-
printing was admissible under the Frye standard.11 5
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Schwartz1 held
that DNA testing is admissible under the Frye standard, but that the
testing results must still be reliable. 7 In Schwartz the defendant was
indicted for first degree murder. 11 8 The DNA testing was performed on
blood found on a pair of the defendant's jeans, blood from a shirt found
near the scene of the murder, and blood samples from the defendant
and the victim. 9 The reviewing court was troubled by the apparent
unreliability 20 of the DNA testing performed by Cellmark and by the
fact that Cellmark might not meet all the minimum DNA testing
guidelines in order for the FBI to consider their testing results ade-
quate for court use.12 1 The Supreme Court of Minnesota also upheld its
previous ruling prohibiting the use of population frequency statistics in
criminal cases. 2 In considering whether the probative value of the sta-
tistical frequency evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect on
11I. Id. at 392.
112. Id. at 398.
113. People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 658 (App. Div. 1988). See supra notes 97-108
and accompanying text.
114. Cobey, 559 A.2d at 398. Cellmark claimed that the probability of two people having
the same DNA fingerprint was one in 30 billion. Id. at 392 n.7.
115. See id. at 398. The Cellmark data base involved 700 individuals who had been tested
with the Cellmark probe technique. Id.
116. 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
117. Id. at 425-26.
118. Id. at 423.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 426. While performing a proficiency test for the California Association of Crime
Laboratory Directors, Cellmark had incorrectly identified two samples as coming from the same
individual. Id.
121. Id. at 426-27. Cellmark declared a match between the blood from the jeans and shirt
and the blood from the victim, but the banding patterns from the two samples did not fit
Cellmark's match criteria. Id. at 423-24, 426. Cellmark had previously declared a false match
during a proficiency test with the California Association of Crime Laboratory Directors. Id. at
426. See supra note 120.
122. 447 N.W.2d at 428-29.
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the jury, the court stated, "[I]n dealing with complex technology, like
DNA testing, we remain convinced that juries in criminal cases may
give undue weight and deference to presented statistical evidence and
are reluctant to take that risk.' ' 23 The court in Schwartz confirmed
that DNA testing is controlled by the Frye standard, but laboratory




States that admit DNA testing data under the relevancy standard
must also be concerned with the reliability of the testing procedures
and controls utilized to ensure reliability of the tests.'25 The three step
analysis performed by courts when using the relevancy standard in-
cludes a determination of the probative value of the evidence, a deter-
mination of whether the evidence might unfairly prejudice the jury,
and a balancing of these dangers against the probative value.t" Much
of the criticism of the relevancy standard is aimed at the fact that
judges do not have the required scientific background and, therefore,
must rely on the testimony of expert witnesses when assessing probative
value. "'27 The greatest risk of this approach is when the scientific evi-
dence or technique is new and few experts are familiar with the new
technology. 28 In the area of DNA technology, the risk of using the
relevancy approach is low because the number of experts available to
testify has been adequate.1
2 9
In the Florida DNA profiling case of Andrews v. State,"' experts
testified for the State but none testified for the defense.' After DNA
evidence was admitted, the defendant was convicted of "aggravated
battery, sexual battery, and armed burglary of a dwelling."" 2
123. Id. at 428.
124. Id.
125. GIANNELLI, supra note 28, § 1-5 (F), at 29-30.
126. Bechtold, supra note 37, at 255.
127. Bechtold, supra note 37, at 256.
128. Bechtold, supra note 37, at 256-57. The ruling in United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d
1194 (2d Cir. 1978), demonstrates the problem of applying the relevancy standard to new technol-
ogy. See Bechtold, supra note 37, at 256-57. In that case the appeals court ruled that voice spec-
trographic analysis was not per se inadmissible, and the National Academy of Sciences later de-
termined that the technique lacked a solid theoretical basis. Id. at 257.
129. See People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (Sup. Ct. 1989). Five experts testified for
the prosecution and five experts testified for the defendant. Id.
130. 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
131. Id. at 849. Dr. David E. Housman, professor of molecular genetics at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, Allen Guisti, a forensic scientist at Lifecodes, Inc., and Dr. Michael
Baird, the manager of forensic testing at Lifecodes, testified for the State. Id. at 847.
132. Id. at 842.
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Lifecodes performed the DNA testing and produced radiographs of the
victim's and defendant's blood as well as a radiograph of the victim's
vaginal smear, all of which were shown and explained to the jury.' 3
Using the relevancy standard, the appellate court determined that the
radiographs were helpful to the jury and that the probative value of the
expert testimony and DNA testing data was not substantially out-
weighed by the potential prejudicial effect.134
In 1990 the Georgia Supreme Court considered the standard it
would use to determine the admissibility of DNA test results. 135 The
defendant, convicted of murder, challenged Lifecodes' quality control
procedures, the methods used to declare a match, and the probability
calculations presented by Lifecodes at trial. 13" The state supreme court
ruled that the trial court need not exclude novel scientific evidence
when there is a possibility of error as long as the testing laboratory
takes necessary precautions and has adequate protocol to address the
possibility of error.1 7 The supreme court further determined that the
trial court had not erred when it allowed Lifecodes to present evidence
of its procedure to determine a match when the banding patterns on
the radiographs, produced from two samples, did not line up exactly."3 8
Six experts testified for the State and four experts testified for the de-
fendant as to the adequacy of the declared match. 39 The defendant's
expert challenged the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium assumption for the
Lifecodes' probability calculations. 40 None of the State's experts had
studied the Lifecodes' data base. 41 An expert for the defendant testi-
fied that his studies indicated that the relevant populations were not in
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium." 2 The court allowed a more conservative
estimate of probability (one in 250,000) in lieu of Lifecodes' original
claim."
The Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Brown"' also adopted the
133. Id. at 849. The radiographs are the DNA prints produced by the exposure of x-ray
film to the radiated DNA probes. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
134. 553 So. 2d at 849-51.
135. Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 437 (Ga. 1990).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 442.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 437.
140. Id. at 443.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 444.
144. 470 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1991).
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relevancy standard for the admission of DNA matching evidence. 145
The defendant, convicted of first degree murder and second degree
theft, challenged the reliability of the DNA testing procedure and the
admissibility of probability data. 14' Because Iowa had rejected the Frye
standard, the court admitted the DNA test data under Iowa Rule of
Evidence 702.147 In Brown the defendant's argument that the statistical
evidence should not have been admitted was based on the fact that the
jury could have determined the probabilities without the assistance of
expert testimony."' 8 The court rejected this argument because it was
unlikely that the jurors could calculate the correct probabilities and
because the issue of identity based on statistics was still a jury determi-
nation." 9 The jury was free to believe or disbelieve the experts. 5 '
Although the courts are divided on the standards under which they
admit DNA matching evidence, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
announced in United States v. Two Bulls151 that before DNA evidence
may be admitted under either the Frye standard or Rule 702, a proper
foundation must be laid demonstrating the reliability of any scientific
testing or laboratory procedure. 1 2 This showing must be made before
the evidence is admitted because the potential prejudice to the defend-
ant is extremely high and the DNA profiling evidence is so new. 53 The
Two Bulls court noted that if the reliability of the testing protocol is
not demonstrated at trial and the evidence is excluded for lack of foun-
dation, the jury will have heard the DNA testing results and question
why the defendant objected to the results.' 5 '
The Eighth Circuit was also concerned that although DNA evi-
dence has been found acceptable and reliable by some courts, it also
has been successfully attacked because of prejudice, relevancy, and lab-
oratory protocol. 155 Two Bulls decision was remanded and the trial
court was instructed to determine in a pretrial hearing whether the
145. Id. at 32.
146. Id. at 30-31.
147. Id. at 32-33. The Iowa standard for admissibility of scientific evidence was established
in State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980). Such evidence must be established as reliable, and
it must meet the admission requirements for expert testimony. Brown, 470 N.W.2d at 32.
148. Brown, 470 N.W.2d at 33.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990).
152. Id. at 60. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
153. 918 F.2d at 60.
154. Id. This, the court noted, is an obvious prejudice to a defendant. Id.
155. Id. at 61.
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DNA evidence and testing procedures were acceptable in the scientific
community. 56 A determination was also to be made as to whether the
testing procedures were followed by the laboratory, whether the testing
data was more prejudicial than probative, and whether the statistics
and probability data used to show the likelihood of two persons having
the same DNA pattern were more probative than prejudicial under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.157
Commenting on the statistical evidence, the Eighth Circuit noted
that in criminal cases, juries may give too much weight to statistical
evidence.15 8 A Florida district appeals court affirmed the admission of
statistical data, estimating that the DNA banding pattern of the de-
fendant would be found in only one individual out of 234 billion people
even though there are only five billion people on earth. 59 Yet other
cases hold that it is improper to allow experts to testify to very high
statistical probabilities because it suggests proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.'6 0
In People v. Collins'6' the prosecution introduced testimony as to
the probability of persons with the same characteristics as the two de-
fendants who committed a robbery, and the California Supreme Court
ruled that fundamental prejudicial error resulted from a lack of foun-
dation as to the evidence and statistical theory.' 62 There was also inad-
equate proof that the characteristics used in the probability calculation
were statistically independent. 6 3 The manner in which the probability
evidence was used distracted the jury from its primary duty of consid-
ering the evidence on the issue of guilt.'
6 4
In the New York case People v. Shi Fu Huang,6 5 the trial court
ruled in a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of DNA fin-
156. Id.
157. Id. See supra note 79.
158. 918 F.2d at 61 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989)
("J]uries in criminal cases may give undue weight and deference to presented statistical evidence
and we are reluctant to take that risk.")).
159. Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694, 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
160. Id. The court cited State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1987), State v.
Boyd, 331 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. 1983) and State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978) for the
proposition that expert testimony as to very high probabilities suggests proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and thus preempts the jury determination. Martinez, 549 So. 2d at 695.
161. 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968).
162. Id. at 36, 38.
163. Id. at 39.
164. Id. at 38.
165. 546 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
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gerprinting evidence that although New York case law allowed admis-
sion of DNA identification testing evidence, the statistical calculation
estimating the probability of an incorrect match would be restricted to
the most conservative estimate.'" The court concluded that since the
defendant did not challenge the people's expert witness, the sample was
sufficient and reliable to be presented to the jury at trial for their deter-
mination as to the weight to be given the statistical data.
167
In addition to the concern for the statistics upon which DNA
matching probabilities are based, challenges to the process have cen-
tered on the qualifications and biases of the experts and the techniques
used in the laboratory process.""8 Many DNA research scientists ini-
tially called as experts were financially irivolved with the commercial
laboratory that performed the test or were scientists whose careers and
reputations were tied to the public acceptance of the testing and admis-
sibility of the evidence. 69 In other cases the research scientists called
as experts were not familiar with the actual procedures and protocol
used in forensic laboratories."' Studies also indicate that the testing
protocol used in commercial laboratories is not completely foolproof.1
7 '
Although the reliability of DNA matching techniques used in re-
search and diagnostic laboratories is unchallenged, there is no complete
agreement as to the reliability of these techniques as applied to de-
graded, contaminated, and very small samples prevalent in forensic
DNA matching tests. 172 There is no agreement as to the reliability of
forensic DNA profiling tests in the relevant scientific community when
the tests are performed on small, degraded samples.' Laboratories
have not conducted tests to establish the reliability of testing proce-
166. Id. at 922. The defendant, Shi Fu Huang, was indicted for second degree murder and
second degree burglary. Id. at 920. The blood samples for the population data base were 167
blood samples from mainland China. Id. at 922. Since the data base was less than the 200 re-
quired for a valid statistical data base, the estimate of the probability of an individual possessing
the DNA banding pattern was limited to one in one billion instead of one in 20 billion. Id. See
supra note 64 and accompanying text.
167. 546 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
168. Shines, supra note 58, at 16.
169. Shines, supra note 58, at 17.
170. Shines, supra note 58, at 18.
171. Shines, supra note 58, at 18. A test conducted with three commercial laboratories,
Lifecodes, Cellmark and FSA/Cetus, resulted in Cellmark making one typing error in 49 DNA
samples. Id. FSA/Cetus also made one typing error in a comparable number of samples. Id.
These typing errors resulted in incorrect matches. Id.
172. Gonzales, supra note 65, at 52.
173. Gonzales, supra note 65, at 52.
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dures in the forensic application, nor have they published procedures
and protocols in journals where they can be reviewed by disinterested
experts in the field. 174 Due to the lack of validation of forensic DNA
matching techniques there is still a question of demonstrated
reliability.
176
III. REASONING OF THE COURT IN PRATER
In Prater v. State7 1 the Arkansas Supreme Court began its analy-
sis by observing that the majority approach for the admission of novel
scientific evidence is the Frye test.17 7 Arkansas never adopted the Frye
standard and instead admits scientific evidence based on the relevancy
approach of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 1 7  This is a more liberal
standard because the trial court makes the decision based on Federal
Rules of Evidence 401 and 402 and the evidence presented by the par-
ties rather than what is acceptable to the majority of the scientific com-
munity identified with the particular technical field.1 79 The court noted
that a determination of admissibility under the relevancy standard re-
quires the trial court to make a determination of the reliability of the
new process used to produce the evidence, the possibility that the evi-
dence would overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and finally, the
relationship of the evidence under consideration to the facts in
174. Gonzales, supra note 65, at 53. Although the FBI Crime Lab outlined its method for
conducting research, none of the laboratories conducting forensic DNA testing, including
Cellmark Diagnostics, Cetus, the FBI, Forensic Science Associates, and Lifecodes, has published
its procedures. Id. One laboratory has claimed the information on its protocol is proprietary and is
not subject to validation by disinterested scientists. Id.
175. Gonzales, supra note 65, at 53.
176. 307 Ark. 180, 820 S.W.2d 429 (1991) (Justice Dudley wrote the opinion for the
majority).
177. Id. at 184. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); supra note
70 and accompanying text.
178. 307 Ark. at 185, 820 S.W. 2d at 431. See ARK. R. EVID. 401, 402; Edward J. Im-
winkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the Perspective of
Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554, 558 (1983) (noting that several states "which have
adopted evidence codes patterned after the Federal Rules, have found Frye is no longer good
law.").
179. 307 Ark. at 185, 820 S.W.2d at 431. See Imwinkelried, supra note 178, at 559 (point-
ing out that many jurisdictions are abandoning the Frye standard for a more relaxed standard.
"[I]n two federal circuits and thirteen states, the precedential value of Frye is either nonexistent
or suspect."). Note that the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which Arkansas has adopted, are pat-
terned after the Federal Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, Arkansas Rules of Evidence 401 and
402 are virtually identical to Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402.
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dispute.'
Reliability of the new process or technique is critical in the rele-
vancy approach, 181 and the reliability is determined in part by having
an established protocol to guide the performance of the test and the
testing controls to ensure that the protocol is followed. 182 The court
must have the ability to determine the reliability of the test data, and
when the court cannot review the data or ensure reliability, the tests
should not be admitted.1
8 3
Although not required by the relevancy approach, the court may
look to the relevant scientific community in determining reliability of a
novel technique. 84 The court in Prater listed several other factors
which may be used to determine reliability of a new or novel scientific
technique. 8 Among these factors are novelty, relationship to estab-
lished techniques, available literature on the new technique, and quali-
fication of the expert witnesses. 18  The court also reasoned that the reli-
ability of a novel technique may be determined by the rate of error in
the results, with significant value being assigned to a technique which
always produces correct results.18
The Prater court emphasized that under the relevancy approach a
heavy burden is placed on the trial judge to determine whether the
laboratory performing the test followed reliable procedures.' 88 The
court followed the Schwartz criteria' 89 and held that if reliable proce-
dures are not followed, the evidence is not admissible. 9 ' The Arkansas
Supreme Court stated that the trial judge also has the burden of ensur-
180. 307 Ark. at 186, 820 S.W.2d at 431. The more liberal relevancy standard is based on
the relevancy approach of Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 702. Id. at 185. 820 S.W.2d
at 431.
181. Id. at 186, 820 S.W.2d at 431.
182. Id. at 188, 820 S.W.2d at 433.
183. Id. See State v.Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989). In that case, Ceilmark
performed the DNA tests but refused to reveal their testing methodology to the defendant. Id.
Since the test results lacked fundamental adequacy, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held the
DNA test result inadmissible. Id.
184. 307 Ark. at 186, 820 S.W.2d at 431.
185. Id.
186. Id. See United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1990) ("The trial court
is to decide . . . whether DNA evidence is generally accepted by the scientific community.").
187. 307 Ark. at 186, 820 S.W.2d at 432.
188. Id. at 188, 820 S.W.2d at 433. See Robinson, supra note 34, at 182 (explaining that
even if DNA testing is accepted in the scientific community, the evidence is not admissible if the
laboratory did not follow appropriate procedures and controls.).
189. See supra text accompanying note 124.
190. 307 Ark. at 188, 820 S.W.2d at 433.
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ing the reliability of statistics and probabilities which arise from the
scientific evidence.19' In the area of DNA testing, the trial judge must
determine the reliability of population genetic data bases used to estab-
lish the probabilities of an incorrect DNA match.192
These determinations are made at a pretrial hearing where the op-
ponent has the opportunity to challenge the reliability and admissibility
of the scientific evidence.1 93 If the evidence is admitted, the opponent
may still directly attack the evidence at trial because the credibility of
the evidence and the weight the jury gives the evidence are still in
issue.19'
The court was concerned with the possibility that the jury may be
misled by the evidence, especially where the jury does not see the data,
but relies instead on the opinion and conclusions of an expert wit-
ness.' 95 The court stated that Arkansas Rule of Evidence 702, like
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, has a "presumption of helpfulness" to
the jury.'" Therefore, if the scientific evidence is reliable and it will
not mislead or confuse the jury, the relevancy approach favors admissi-
bility of the evidence. 9 Before scientific evidence may be found help-
ful to the jury under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 702, the court must
find that its probative value is not outweighed by unfair prejudice
under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403.198
The court's final area of concern on the question of relevancy was
that the expert testimony be sufficiently tied to the facts.19 If the pro-
ponent of the evidence does not meet this burden, the evidence should
be excluded.20 0 The court in Prater concluded that novel scientific evi-
dence generated by a reliable scientific process, so long as it is helpful
to the jury and is connected to the disputed factual issue, is admissible
under the relevancy standard.
2 0 1
The court in Prater stated that DNA matching evidence may be




195. Id. at 188-90, 820 S.W.2d at 433.
196. Id. at 190, 820 S.W.2d at 433.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 190, 820 S.W.2d at 434. The court must ensure that there is sufficient founda-
tional basis to admit DNA evidence because it is so new and because the potential to prejudice the
defendant is so great. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d at 60.
199. 307 Ark. at 190, 820 S.W.2d at 434.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 186, 820 S.W.2d at 431.
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admissible without evidence of the probability of incorrect matches.202
However, the State successfully offered probability testimony.20 The
Arkansas Supreme Court noted that the Supreme Court of Minnesota
did not allow statistical evidence because of its tendency to confuse or
prejudice the jury. 0" The Arkansas Supreme Court closely followed
Alabama's approach and separated the determination of the probability
of an incorrect match based on population genetics from the determina-
tion of the reliability of DNA matching procedures."0 The court con-
cluded that population genetic probabilities are relevant, can be helpful
to the jury, and should be submitted to the jury if they are reliable.'"
IV. ANALYSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE
The decision in Prater is significant because it announces the
adoption of the more permissive relevancy standard as the test for ad-
missibility of novel scientific evidence in Arkansas courts.20 The court
also announced the admissibility of both DNA evidence208 and
probability data evidence when a proper foundation is shown.'" This
liberalization will put a heavier burden on judges because they must
determine the reliability and relevancy of novel scientific evidence by
factors other than the acceptance of the technique by members in the
applicable scientific field.2 10
Attorneys may be encouraged to offer more types of novel scien-
tific evidence as modern technology produces more novel approaches
and the standards become more permissive.21 Attorneys must consider
202. Id. at 197, 820 S.W.2d at 437. See Andre A. Moenssens, DNA Evidence and Its Crit-
ics-How Valid are the Challenges, 31 JURIMETRICS J. 87 (1990). "Evidence of a DNA match
made by a scientist who followed the proper laboratory protocols is admissible without drawing
statistical inferences therefrom." Id. at 105. For example, firearms experts testify that the stria-
tions on two bullets match exactly without giving the probabilities that no other bullets could
randomly match. Id. at n.68.
203. 307 Ark. at 197, 820 S.W.2d at 437.
204. Id. See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 428 ("In dealing with complex technology,
like DNA testing, we remain convinced that juries in criminal cases may give undue weight and
deference to presented statistical evidence and are reluctant to take that risk.").
205. 307 Ark. at 197, 820 S.W.2d at 437. (citing Ex parte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242 (Ala.
1991)).
206. 307 Ark. at 197-98, 820 S.W.2d at 438.
207. Id. at 185, 820 S.W.2d at 431.
208. Id. at 194, 820 S.W.2d at 436.
209. Id. at 198, 820 S.W.2d at 438.
210. Id. at 186, 820 S.W.2d at 431.
211. lmwinkelried, supra note 178, at 559.
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the expectation of modern jurors212 who have been exposed to television
programs and may have learned to expect scientific evidence such as
fingerprinting comparisons.213 When such expectations are not met, the
jury's concern for why the evidence was not introduced may overwhelm
relevant credible evidence which was introduced." Because reliability
is the critical element in the relevancy approach, trial courts must look
not only to the reliability of the scientific theory, but also to the appli-
cation of the technique and the procedures or protocol of the laboratory
which applies the technique.21 5
The court in Prater extended this determination of reliability to
any mathematical probabilities arising from the scientific evidence. 216
For a specific example of DNA matching evidence, the trial judge must
make a preliminary determination on such matters as population ge-
netic data bases before allowing an expert to calculate the probability
in a certain case.217 There was no meaningful attack on the population
genetics calculation in Prater, but the area is still open to dispute as far
as sample size assumptions and how the population sampling is
accomplished.
218
Criteria for admitting scientific evidence in Prater under the rele-
vancy standard include determination of the reliability of the tech-
nique. The proclaimed "more permissive" approach announced in
Prater looks very similar to the approach used to analyze the DNA
profiling evidence in Castro. The first prong of the analysis required a
determination of a generally accepted theory in the scientific commu-
nity which produces reliable results.21 9 The second prong required a
determination by the court that techniques currently exist to produce
reliable results.22 0 The third prong required a determination whether
the laboratory performed the scientifically accepted tests so as to pro-
duce reliable results. 221 The Prater court's approach to admissibility
212. lmwinkelried, supra note 178, at 559.
213. lmwinkelried, supra note 178, at 560.
214. lmwinkelried, supra note 178, at 559-60.
215. See People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (Suj. Ct. 1989). Under the third prong
of the New York court's analysis, even if the scientific technique meets the Frye standard, it must
be determined at the pretrial hearing whether the testing laboratory utilized the accepted scien-
tific techniques. Id. See supra notes 83-95 and accompany text.
216, 307 Ark. at 189, 820 S.W.2d at 433.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 199, 820 S.W.2d at 439.
219. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
220. Id. at 989-95.
221. Id. at 999.
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under the relevancy standard requires a similar analysis when deter-
mining reliability. Acceptance by the relevant scientific community can
be used as a factor, to determine the reliability of the technique.2
The Prater court's analysis includes a court determination as to
whether the novel scientific evidence will be helpful to the jury under
Arkansas Rule of Evidence 7 0 2 .22' The Schwartz court applied the
Frye standard to DNA matching evidence and excluded the evidence
because it was determined to be unreliable and because it would un-
fairly prejudice the jury.22 These two approaches seem to differ more
in terminology than in substance when applied to DNA evidence.
The Eighth Circuit in Two Bulls remanded the case and directed
the trial court to determine if DNA evidence is generally accepted by
the scientific community and to make reliability determinations very
similar to those used in the relevancy standard approach announced in
Prater.2 5 The admissibility standards for DNA profiling evidence tend
to blur as they are applied by the courts, but the proponents and adver-
saries of novel scientific evidence must focus on reliability of the theory,
reliability of the procedures which apply the theory, reliability of
probability calculations, and the tendency of the evidence to confuse or
unfairly prejudice the jury.
Ralph Spory
222. 307 Ark. at 186, 820 S.W.2d at 431.
223. Id. at 190, 820 S.W.2d at 434.
224. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989).
225. United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1990).
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